Category Archives for "Cybersecurity"
The boundary under consideration is the electronic division between the industrial control system (ICS) and the enterprise network; think of servers and switches. This boundary must be protected from undetected, unauthorized activity in critical systems.
If boundary protection is weak, various threat vectors (pathways) may have access to interface with devices that directly support the control process. Any number of these types of vulnerabilities can cripple your system.
Not only does inadequate boundary protection make it more difficult to detect unauthorized activity, the range of threats increases significantly when there is no logical separation of the ICS network from the enterprise or other trusted systems (i.e. the Internet).
If the boundary layer has been breached and internal access has been established by a rogue actor, this increases the number of vectors that could potentially be under attack in critical systems.
The objective of least functionality is to minimize the computing resources associated with services, functions, ports, and protocols to the bare number of those required to support central system operations.
In other words, if the system has been compromised, limit what the bad actor can access or control once inside.
Authorized organizational users, including processes acting on behalf of organizational users, must be identified and authenticated.
This is especially difficult when securing accounts of personnel who may have administrator access and who leave the organization or travel to another site within the organization.
The goal is to achieve accountability and traceability for every user account in the event an account becomes compromised.
Physical access devices include things like card readers, USB drives, keys, locks, and combinations.
Even though the organization may be able to apply a certain degree of control over employees and visitors, additional physical security may be required to prevent or monitor ICS component access. In some cases, keys that allow physical access may not be under the facility’s control. This could allow unauthorized personnel to access sensitive areas.
When controls are put in place to produce logs of user access, connectivity, and configuration of systems and components, a lot of data is generated.
Without a formalized review and validation of the data that has been collected, unauthorized users or programs may infiltrate the system without detection.
Collected data must be dutifully audited, reviewed and analyzed to report security-related events such as account usage, external connectivity, configuration modifications, and ICS component inventory.